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A CRUEL CHOICE:
PATIENTS FORCED TO DECIDE BETWEEN
MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND EMPLOYMENT

Jonathon has cancer. He was diagnosed a year ago and has
undergone chemotherapy for the last two months, and faces six weeks of
further treatment. Jonathon's treatment causes him to become violently
ill at night, so much so that he cannot sleep. Jonathon works at a large
stereo equipment outlet store. His boss is understanding of his illness
and accommodates Jonathon when necessary by permitting him to leave
work early and even missing full days of work.
Jonathon's doctor prescribed various medications for his nausea
and insomnia.
When the original medication did not quell his
symptoms, his doctor prescribed new medication. Jonathon complained
this new medication made him too groggy the following day, and
affected his performance at work. Eventually, the doctor informed
Jonathon of the possibility of using marijuana to alleviate his symptoms.
Jonathon asked if that was legal. The doctor indicated that in their state
a doctor could legally recommend marijuana and the patient would be
able to use the drug at home, without fear of arrest by the police. The
doctor told him that it was still considered illegal by the federal
government, but the risk of federal prosecution was extremely low.
Jonathon considered this option. The doctor informed him it could
definitely ease his nausea and help him sleep at night. He was about to
ask his doctor what the next step would be, when he remembered that his
employer required random drug testing.
He just had one question. "Can I lose my job?"
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INTRODUCTION

The answer to Jonathon's question is largely left unanswered and
has been deemed a "legal gray area." 1 The California Supreme Court
concluded in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc.2 that under
state law, an employer could legally fire an employee who used medical
marijuana pursuant to the Compassionate Use Act 3 ("CUA") even when
the marijuana use was at home and was not alleged to affect workplace
performance. 4 On the other hand, Rhode Island's medical marijuana law
explicitly states that an employer cannot discriminate against individuals
who use medical marijuana. In total, thirteen states allow doctors to
recommend marijuana to their patients,6 and roughly 300,000 Americans
use medical marijuana for various illnesses and ailments including
cancer, AIDS or HIV, chronic and acute pain, anorexia, migraines,
7
glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, insomnia, epilepsy, and Hepatitis C.
Almost half of those that use marijuana for medical purposes live in
California. 8 California was the first state to recognize a medical
marijuana law with the enactment of the CUA in 1996. 9 The CUA,
1. Stephanie Armour, Employers Grapple With Medical Marijuana Use, USA TODAY, Apr.
18, 2007, at IB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2007-04-16-medicalmarijuana-usat_N.htm. Companies remain uncertain if it is legal to terminate a medical marijuana
user. Questions Grow About Medical Marijuana, Workplace, JOIN TOGETHER, Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthenews/2007/questions-grow-about-medical.htmi.
Labor and employment lawyer Richard Meneghello said: "It's almost an untenable situation.
Employers are screaming for answers ... and there's not one out there right now. There's a lot of
uncertainty. Employers are living in a dangerous situation." Id.
2. 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West 2007).
4. Ross, 174 P.3d at 206-07.
5. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4(b) (West 2008).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 17.35.010 (West 2008); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
l1362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-14-1(b) (West 2001); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 329-122 (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (West 2004); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.26424 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-103 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §
453A.170 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. § 26-2B-1 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (West
2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4473 (West 2007);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.5 1A.005 (West 2009) [hereinafter State Medical MariuanaStatutes].
7. Armour, supra note 1; see also Brief of the American Pain Foundation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 20-24, Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal.
2008), No. C043392 (Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation].
8. StoptheDrugWar.org, Medical Marijuana and the Right to Work: Under Attack in
California and Oregon, At Risk In Most Other States As Well, DRUG WAR CHRONICLE, Feb. 1,
2008,
available
at
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/52 /marijuana
_medical-employee-patient.rights.
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West 2007).
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originally entitled Proposition 215, passed by referendum, a direct
reflection of the will of California's voters. 10 Since then, twelve states
have followed California's initiative: Alaska," t Colorado, 2 Hawaii, 3
Maine, 14 Montana, 15 Nevada,1 6 New Mexico, 17 Washington,1 8 Oregon, 19
Rhode Island,2 ° Vermont,2 1 and Michigan.22
Despite states' efforts to legalize the use of medical marijuana upon
a doctor's recommendation, the drug remains illegal under federal law.2 3
Marijuana is categorized as a Schedule I drug in the Controlled
Substances Act 2 4 ("CSA"). Under the CSA, drugs in this category have
a "high potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States," and a "lack of accepted safety for use of
the drug . . . under medical supervision., 25 The Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") has stated that marijuana has no known medical
benefits, and therefore, does not condone its use for medical purposes.26
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court decision in Gonzales v.
Raich,2 7 held that the federal government's classification of marijuana in
the CSA declares the drug illegal even in a state that allows the medical

10. See Bill Zimmerman & Dave Fratello, Medical Pot Laws Don't Blow Smoke, CANNABIS
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2007, available at http://cannabisnews.com/news/22/thread22501.shtml.
11. ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010 (West 2008).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-14-1 (West 2001).
13. HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-122 (West 2007).
14. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (West 2004).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-101 (West 2007).
16. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.120 (West 2008).
17. N.M. STAT. § 26-2B-1 (West 2008).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.5 1A.005 (West 2009).
19. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (West 2003).
20. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4(a) (West 2008).
21. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4471 (West 2007).
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.26421 (West 2008); see Dennis Hayes, Michigan Medical
Marijuana Act Passes, MICHIGAN MEDICAL MARIJUANA
PATIENTS,
available at
http://www.medicalmarijuanapatients.org/NEWS_1 10408.cfm.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005). Under the
CSA, marijuana is a Schedule I drug, meaning it has no accepted safe use in the United States. §
812. Further, the Supreme Court in Raich held that the Federal Government's classification of the
drug renders it illegal even in a state that allows its medical use. See generally Raich, 545 U.S. at
29.
24. § 812(c)(10).
25. § 812(b)(I)(A-C).
26. Press Release, FDA, Inter-Agency Advisory Regarding Claims That Smoked Marijuana Is
a
Medicine
(Apr.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topicsiNEWS/2006/NEW0I362.html.
27. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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use of marijuana.2 8 However, following the Supreme Court's ruling, it
still remains unclear whether medical marijuana must be accommodated
by an employer.29
This clearly places medical marijuana in a state of limbo. While
various states continue to pass statutes and ordinances that allow the
infirm to choose marijuana as a legal option,30 the use of medical
marijuana is a federal crime. 3 1 Though arrest or prosecution by the
federal government is very unlikely,32 a user may have another concern
if he chooses marijuana. That concern is the very realistic fear of losing
his job. In California (and possibly more states to come), a medical
patient who is allowed to use marijuana pursuant to state law will not be
protected from workplace discrimination for taking, what may be, his
best possible medication. 33 In essence, these states will be allowing a
third party, the employer, to determine the medical decisions of an
employee when those decisions are traditionally left for the patient and
doctor to determine.34

28. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court held that the United States Commerce Clause
allowed the Federal government to prohibit the use of medical marijuana even in states that
permitted such use. Id. "It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is 'superior to
that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,' however legitimate or
dire those necessities may be." Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
29. Compare Press Release, Littler: Employment & Labor Solutions Worldwide, Supreme
Court Ruling on Medical Marijuana to Benefit Employers and Employees, According to Littler
Mendelson
Attorneys
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Lists/Press%20Releases/DispRelease.aspx?id=l 04.
(Attorney Nancy N. Delogu noted the Supreme Court's decision in Raich "permits employers to
rely upon the fact that marijuana use is illegal under federal law ... and to deny employment to
individuals who test positive for marijuana use."), with Josephine Elizabeth Kenney, How State
Medical MarijuanaLaws Affect Workplace Drug Testing, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY, Apr.
2006, available at http://www.civilliberties.org/mmarworkplace.html. (After considering the
Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich, the author noted, "under state and federal [disability
discrimination] laws, employer[s] still may have to consider accommodating an employee whose
medical condition has led to a recommendation of medical marijuana use.").
30. See State Medical MarijuanaStatutes, supra note 6.
31. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006); Raich, 545 U.S. at 57
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Armour, supra note 1.
33. Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation, supra note 7, at 20-24.
34. See id. "That medical treatment is a matter for individuals and their physicians is not
simply a widely held belief that tends to further the general public: it is a bedrock protection .... "
Id. at 8; see also Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 84-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (["N]o law or
policy . . . suggests that a person forfeits his or her right of medical self-determination by entering
into an employment relationship . . . . Indeed, it would be unprecedented . . . to hold that an
employer may dictate to an employee the course of medical treatment he or she must follow, under
pain of termination .... ").
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As Justice Kennard of the California Supreme Court pointed out,
many seriously ill patients are left with only two options.3 5 On the one
hand, they may continue to use marijuana and ease many of their
symptoms but face unemployment.36 Or, on the other hand, they may
37
keep their job, but suffer needlessly from their debilitating illness.
voters intended when
"Surely this cruel choice is not what California
38
they enacted the state Compassionate Use Act."
This Note will discuss the implications of medical marijuana in
disability discrimination law. Section I will discuss various states'
medical marijuana laws and cases brought under state disability law.
Section II will analyze requirements and problems that may arise if an
employee attempts to bring a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") 39 upon termination for medical marijuana use.
Finally, Section III will examine whether a patient's use of medicinal
marijuana is an "illegal use of drugs" 40 for the purposes of the ADA.
I. AN EMPLOYEE'S USE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA: UNDER STATE LAW

Thirteen states have enacted legislation which allows licensed
healthcare professionals to recommend the use of marijuana to their
patients for various medical conditions. 4 1 The specifics of these laws
vary from state to state,4 2 and only Rhode Island contains a provision
explicitly protecting employee rights.43 However, several other states
contain provisions in their medical marijuana laws that could be
35. Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 211 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008). In 2008, Congress amended the ADA in response to United
States Supreme Court cases that narrowed the intended broad protection of the Act to only a small
group of plaintiffs who would be able to prove that their impairment rendered them "substantially
limited in a major life activity," which meant that mitigating measures had to be taken into account.
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-335, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553,
3553 (2008); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc, 527 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1999). The 2008 amendments
instruct courts to no longer take consideration of ameliorating or mitigating measures. ADAAA §
2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2006).
41. See State Medical MarijuanaStatutes, supra note 6.
42. See generally State Medical MarijuanaStatues, supra note 6; ProCon.org, State Medical
MarijuanaLaws, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourcelD=881 (discussing
the laws of the states that have legalized the use of medical marijuana).
43.

StoptheDrugWar.org. supranote 8: see aLso R.I. GEN. LAWS
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interpreted as providing protections for employees. 4 For example, the
Montana Medical Marijuana Act states that a "qualifying patient...
may not be arrested, prosecuted or penalized in any manner or be denied
any right or privilege, including but not limited to civil penalty . . .,,5
Only a few states that allow the medical use of marijuana have
considered the question of how the laws will affect employment,
specifically a private employer's ability to terminate or refuse to hire
employees for their use of medical marijuana.
A. Rhode Island
Rhode Island is currently the only state that specifically protects the
jobs of employees who use medical marijuana.4 6 Rhode Island's statute
states "[n]o school, employer or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ or
lease to or otherwise penalize a person solely for his or her status as a
registered qualifying patient ... ,47 The ultimate goal of this provision
was to ensure that marijuana was treated similarly to other
medications.48 As a result of its inclusion, medical marijuana consumers
in Rhode Island are the most protected in the nation. They receive
protections that they can rely on up-front, instead of being forced to
litigate those protections after damage has incurred.49
B. Oregon
California and Oregon are the only two states whose courts have
substantively tested the issue of medical marijuana use and employment
under their state's disability discrimination law. In the Oregon case,
Washburn v. Columbia Forest Products,50 the plaintiff, Robert
Washburn, was hired as a millwright for Columbia Forest Products, with
responsibilities that included maintaining dangerous heavy equipment.51

44. StoptheDrugWar.org, supranote 8.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-201(1) (West 2007).
46. StoptheDrugWar.org, supranote 8; § 21-28.6-4(b).
47. § 21-28.6-4(b).
48. StoptheDrugWar.org, supra note 8. Jesse Stout, the executive director of the Rhode
Island Patient Advocacy Coalition said that employee protection was included because "we went to
our patients and asked them what they thought, and they said they wanted marijuana treated like any
other medicine." Id.
49. Id.
50. 104 P.3d 609 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
51. Id. at 610.
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Washburn had trouble sleeping due to muscle spasms that occurred at
night. Washburn's doctor recommended that he use marijuana as part
of the Oregon medical marijuana program.53 Washburn heeded his
doctor's recommendation.
Washburn found that the marijuana
alleviated his sleeping disorder.54 He requested that his employer
accommodate his disability through a drug test that would only
determine if he was currently under the influence of marijuana in lieu of
the drug test required for other employees.5 5 The traditional test detects
trace amounts of marijuana in one's system and can provide a positive
result two to three weeks after the marijuana use. 56 Washburn's
employer refused to make the accommodation and subsequently
terminated him for failing the drug test. 57 Washburn brought an action
alleging that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate his
disability as required by Oregon's disability law.58
The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on two
grounds: Washburn was not disabled as a matter of law, and the
employer was not required to accommodate the use of marijuana. 59 The
court believed that the definition of "disabled person" under Oregon law
had to be analyzed in "lockstep" with the similar provision defining
"person with a disability" under the ADA.6 ° At that time, this meant that
mitigating factors, such as medications, would have to be taken into
account when assessing whether a person's impairment substantially
limited a major life activity. 61 The trial court noted that since the
marijuana alleviated Washburn's insomnia, he was no longer disabled,
and unable to state a claim under the act.62 Further, the court found that
52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 610-11.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 611. The test the employer provided could only detect whether the employee had

used marijuana in the previous two to three weeks and could not detect whether the employee was
currently impaired. Id.

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.

60.
61.

See id. at 612.
Id.; see generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding

mitigating measures had to be considered when assessing whether an individual had a disability).
But see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(l) (2008). The ADA was

amended in 2008, took effect on January 1, 2009, and stated that mitigating measures no longer
needed to be taken into account when determining whether a person was disabled. The amendments

expressly overruled the decision from Sutton. S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2008).
62. WK-shbvrn, !04 P.3d at 6! !.
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the Oregon medical marijuana law provided that an employer was not
required to accommodate medical marijuana at the workplace.6 3
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's findings on both
issues. 64 First, the court noted that Oregon disability law did not
mandate that the definition of "disabled person" be analyzed in
"lockstep" with federal law, and the plain language of the law did not
require mitigating measures to be taken into account.65 The court found
that Washburn could be found disabled and, as a result, summary
judgment was improvidently granted.66
The next issue the Court of Appeals considered was whether the
use of medical marijuana had to be accommodated.6 7 The Oregon
Medical Marijuana Act 68 specifically stated that nothing in the act shall
be construed to require "[a]n employer to accommodate the medical use
of marijuana in any workplace., 69 The main question for the court was
whether, by having trace elements of marijuana in his system at work,
did Washburn use marijuana in the workplace? 70 Oregon law defined
"medical use of marijuana" as "the production, possession, delivery, or
administration of marijuana, or paraphernalia used to administer
marijuana, as necessary for the exclusive benefit of a person to mitigate
the symptoms or effects of his or her debilitating medical condition. 7
Since it was undisputed that Washburn did not produce, deliver or
administer marijuana in the workplace, the issue became whether he
possessed marijuana in the workplace by having trace elements of the
drug in his urine.72 The court followed a holding in the criminal law
context where it was decided that a person no longer possessed a
controlled substance after the drug was consumed and entered the bodily
fluids.73 Since Washburn did notpossess the drug in the workplace, then
he did not use the drug in the workplace, and the provision stating that
an employer need not accommodate the "medical use of marijuana in

63. Id.
64. Id.at 616.
65. Id. at 612. This issue was a matter of first impression for the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Id. at 611.
66. Idat 613.
67. Id.
68. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (West 2003).
69. Washburn, 104 P.3d at 613; § 475.340(2).
70. Washburn, 104 P.3d at 613.
71. Id.; § 475.302(7).
72. Washburn, 104 P.3d at 614.
73. Id. (citing State v. Daline, 30 P.3d 426, 430 (2001)).
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[the] workplace 74 had no significance to the case.75 The Court of
Appeals left for the trial court the issue
of what, if any, would be a
76
necessary reasonable accommodation.
The Oregon Supreme Court took a different position on the issues
involved in Washburn.77 The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the
Court of Appeals' holding that the provision defining "disabled person"
did not have to be analyzed in "lockstep" with the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 8 However, the court held that by looking at the plain
language of the definition, which used the present indicative tense, the
assessment of whether an individual had a disability should be analyzed
by taking into account mitigating factors for a determination whether the
individual was presently disabled, rather then potentially or
hypothetically disabled.79 After the Oregon Supreme Court took the
plaintiffs medication into consideration, it determined that the plaintiff
did not meet the definition of "disabled.', 80 Accordingly, he did not
receive protection under Oregon's disability law. 8' The court, however,
did not overrule the Court of Appeals' ruling that an employee who used
marijuana during off-duty hours and not on the employer's premises did
not use marijuana in the workplace. 8' Thus, in Oregon there is the
potential that if an employee is actually disabled and terminated for his
use of medical marijuana, he may succeed under Oregon disability
discrimination law.
Shortly after this case was decided, the Oregon legislature
considered amending the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act to include a
provision giving employers a right to terminate employees for their use
of marijuana "regardless of where the use occurs. 8 3 The bill was
designed to strengthen an employer's ability to terminate an employee

74. § 475.340(2).
75. Washburn, 104 P.3d at 614.
76. Id. at 616.
77. Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prod. Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 162 (Or. 2006).
78. Seeid. at 164-65.
79. Id. at 164.
80. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court only considered the prescription medication that
Washburn took prior to taking the medical marijuana. See id. However, one should note that if the
court was concerned with whether Washburn was presently disabled, it should have considered the
medical marijuana which he presently utilized, rather then prescription medication that he used prior
to 1999.
81. Washburn, 134 P.3d at 166.
82. Id. at 164. The court limited its inquiry to whether the plaintiff was disabled. Id.
93,

S.B. 465. 2007 Sen.. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
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for their use of medical marijuana. 84 Opponents of the bill argued that
urinalysis, the drug test commonly used by employers, cannot accurately
test for impairment. 85 However, proponents of the bill argued that
marijuana use, whether at the job or at home, presented a safety risk to
anyone at the job site.86 The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 23 to 5,87
but then moved to the House where it died in committee.8 8 Currently, a
revised version of the bill is being debated in the Oregon legislature. 89
C. California
In California the issue of medical marijuana and employment was
analyzed in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc.90 Pursuant to
the CUA, Gary Ross' physician recommended he use marijuana to treat
chronic pain that he suffered from since being injured serving in the Air
Force. 9 1 Ross' employer required that he take a drug test, which tested
positive for THC, the active chemical found in marijuana. 92 Ross gave
the employer a copy of his physician's recommendation for the drug;
nevertheless he was fired.93 Subsequently, Ross brought charges against
the employer alleging disability discrimination under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act 94 ("FEHA") and wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.95
The California Supreme Court held that an employee whose doctor
recommended medical marijuana was not immune from termination by a
disapproving employer upon the failure of a drug test, despite the fact
84. Libby Tucker, Medical Marijuana Bill Ignites a Debate in Oregon Legislature,DAILY J.
OF COM., Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/services/religious-grantmakingcivic-professional/4066124-l.html. The bill also stated that nothing in the Oregon marijuana law
shall be construed to "[r]equire an employer to [a]llow any person who is impaired by the use of
marijuana to remain in the workplace" or "[p]reclude or restrict an employer from establishing or
enforcing a policy to achieve or maintain a drug-free workforce." S.B. 465, 2007 Sen., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2007).
85. Libby Tucker, Oregon Senate Passes Medical Marijuana Bill, DAILY J. OF COM., Mar.
16, 2007, availableat http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qn4184/is_20070316/ai_n 18738226.
86. See id.
87.

Id.

88.
89.

StoptheDrugWar.org, supra note 8.
Id.

90.

174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008).

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.

94.
95.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 121900 (West 2005).
Ross, 174 P.3d at 203.
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that the marijuana use was legal under state law. 96 The court began by
stating that marijuana is not afforded the same status as other
prescription drugs. 97 The court construed the CUA to apply narrowly,
by only protecting those who possess medical marijuana from criminal
prosecution.98 The court noted that the CUA was devoid of any
language that would suggest it was addressing the issue of employee
rights and privileges. 99 Further, the court stated that FEHA did
not
l00
protect people who used drugs that were illegal under federal law.
The California Supreme Court relied heavily on case law that gave
employers the ability to test employees and applicants for illicit drug
use. Loder v. Glendale1° ' provided that employers had the right to test
for drug use "[i]n light of the well-documented problems that are
associated with the abuse of drugs and alcohol by employees-increased
absenteeism, diminished productivity, greater health costs, increased
safety problems and potential liability to third parties, and more frequent
turnover .... ,,102 However, as the dissent in Ross noted, the majority's
reliance on Loder may have been misplaced. 10 3 The workplace drug
policy in Loder stated that if the drug test revealed "the presence of
drugs for which the applicant [had] no legitimate medical explanation,
the applicant was disqualified from hiring or promotion., 10 4 Ross, on
the other hand, did have a legitimate medical explanation for his
marijuana use; it was recommended by his doctor to treat chronic pain
and it was used pursuant to state law.10 5 Since the marijuana use in Ross
was pursuant to a legitimate medical purpose, and not associated with
drug abuse, the concerns in Loder of increased
absenteeism and
10 6
diminished work productivity were inapplicable.

96. See id. at 203.
97. See generally id. at 204-06.
98. See id. at 205-06.

99. Id. at 205. The court noted that the CUA merely exempted medical marijuana users from
criminal liability under state statutes, and "nothing in the text or history of the CUA suggested that
the voters intended to address the rights and obligations of employees and employers." Id. at 204.
100. Id. at 205.
101.
102.

927 P.2d 1200 (Cal. 1997).
Id. at 1222-23 (emphasis added); Ross, 174 P.3d at 204.

103.

Ross, 174 P.3d at 214 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

104.
105.

Loder, 927 P.2d at 1205 (emphasis added); Ross, 174 P.3d at 214.
Ross, 174 P.3d at 214 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

106. See id.
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What is most stirring about the majority opinion in Ross is the lack
of analysis under the FEHA, the law under which the suit was
brought. 10 7 The majority analyzes the issue as if the case was brought
under a violation of the CUA, and finds that the CUA did not create any
employment rights. 0 8 However, under the FEHA, employers have the
duty to provide a "reasonable accommodation" to employees that suffer
from a disability. 10 9 The majority concludes that it would not be a
"reasonable accommodation" for an employer to accommodate an
employee's medical use of marijuana." 0
The plaintiff contended that by enacting an amendment to the CUA
that explicitly stated that employers need not accommodate the use of
medical marijuana at the jobsite,"' the FEHA and the CUA acting
together required the accommodation of the use of marijuana when it
occurred at home during off-duty hours.' 12 Five state legislators who
authored the amendment provided amici curae concurring with the
plaintiffs interpretation." 3 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
rejected it. 114 The court did not analyze the fact that there is a general
rule that disabled employees must be reasonably accommodated under
the FEHA, but only noted that the CUA did not provide any employee
protections.' 15
Two justices vehemently dissented from the Ross majority with
regards to the FEHA claim. 1 6 The dissent characterized the majority's
107. See Vikram David Amar, The California Supreme Court's Decision on Whether an
Employee Can be Fired For Testing Positive for Off-The-Job, Doctor-Suggested Medical Use of
Marijuana,FINDLAW, Feb. 1, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20080201.html. The author
called the opinion "less than satisfying" and noted,
the court's narrow reading of the CUA isn't persuasive in disposing of this case simply
because Ross' claim is brought under the FEHA, not under the CUA directly. Thus, the
question shouldn't be whether the CUA "speaks to" employment law (as the court
asked), but rather whether the CUA's existence has an effect on employment law,
particularly on what "reasonable accommodation" under the FEHA means.
Id.
108. Ross, 174 P.3d at 204-05; see also Amar, supra note 107.
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(m) (West 2005).
110. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 212 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
11l. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a) (West 2005) ("Nothing in this article shall
require any accommodation of any medical use of marijuana on the property or premises of any
place of employment or during the hours of employment .
.
112. Ross, 174 P.3d at 207.
113. Id. at 207-08.
114. Id. at 208.
115.

Id.

116. Id. at 209-16. The two justices dissented to the FEHA claim, but concurred with the
public policy issue. Id. at 210.
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opinion as "conspicuously lacking in compassion."'" 17 Unlike the
majority, the dissent analyzed the plaintiffs claim utilizing the FEHA,
stating:
Nothing in the text of the FEHA. . supports the proposition that a
requested accommodation can never be deemed reasonable if it
involves off-duty conduct by the employee away from the jobsite that
is criminal under federal law, even though that same conduct
is
8
expressly protected from criminal sanction under state law."1
The FEHA includes, "adjustment or modification of examinations,
training materials or policies" as examples
of reasonable
9
accommodations. '
Therefore, according to the CUA amendment,
though an employer need not accommodate an employee's medical
marijuana use at the jobsite,120 the FEHA mandates a general rule that an
employer must accommodate an employee's disability.' 2' Thus, medical
marijuana would have to be accommodated when used in order to
mitigate a disability, unless the use took place at the jobsite. The dissent
directly stated:
[U]nless an employer can demonstrate that an employee's doctorapproved use of marijuana under the [CUA] while off duty and away
from the jobsite is likely to impair the employer's business operations
in some way, or that the employer has offered another reasonable and
effective form of accommodation, the employer's discharge of
the
22
employee is disability discrimination prohibited by the [FEHA].1
Additionally, the dissent noted that though marijuana has
intoxicating effects, so do many other prescription drugs. 123 In fact,
several over the counter medications have effects that could impair the
productiveness of employees on their particular jobsite. 1 4 According to

117. Id. at 209.
118. Id. at 212.
119. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(n)(2) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a) (West 2005).
121. See CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 12926.
122. Ross, 174 P.3d at 209-10.
123. Id. at 214.
124. Id. at 215; see also Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation, supra note 7, at 1415, 26 (reporting that opioids can have very debilitating side effects including nausea, drowsiness
and confusion, and can lead to physical dependence; additionally, continual use of over-the-counter
medication, such as aspirin or ibuprofen can lead to side effects such as ulcers and stomach
bleeding).
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the dissent, the majority's argument that marijuana is different solely
due to its intoxicating affect is baseless inasmuch as the majority does
not deny that employers must make accommodations for other
potentially intoxicating drugs. 125 Ultimately, the dissent opines that it is
improper for an employer to summarily fire an employee for at-home
use of medical marijuana without requiring the employer to demonstrate
26
how the employee's drug use will damage their business interests. 1
On February 20, 2008, less then a month after the California
Supreme Court decided Ross, a bill was introduced in the California
legislature that sought to overturn this ruling. 127 The bill would still
permit employers to prohibit medical marijuana consumption at the
workplace. 128 However, it would prohibit employers from firing an
employee for use of medical marijuana when used at home and where it
would not affect job performance. 129 Assemblymember Mark Leno said,
"[the bill] is merely an affirmation of the intent of the voters and the
legislature that medical marijuana patients need not be unemployed to
benefit from their medicine." 130
The bill was approved by the
legislature.' 3 1 However, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill. 32
Thus, the decision in Ross to remains as the law in California.
While the questions concerning medical marijuana and employment
have been determined in a few courts with regards to state law, no court
has substantively questioned whether federal law, namely the ADA,
protects employees from discrimination based on their medical
marijuana use.' 33 Assuming that the use takes place at home and does
125. Ross, 174 P.3d at 215; see also Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation, supra
note 7, at 26 ("It is indisputable that many traditional medications, [even when] properly used, can
affect work performance and safety in ways far more serious then off-premises medical marijuana
use possibly could.").

126. Ross, 174 P.3d at 209-10.
127. Press Release, Americans for Safe Access, State Bill Protects Employment Rights of
Medical
Marijuana
Patients
(Feb.
21,
2008)
available
at
http://www.americansforsafeaccess.org/article.php?id=5466.
128. Id.
129. Id. The bill carved out an exception for safety-sensitive positions. Id.
130. Id.
131. Press Release, Americans for Safe Access, Medical Marijuana Employment Rights Bill
Passes
Both
California
Houses
(Aug.
20,
2008),
available
at
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.phpid=5559.
132. Julian Ayrs, Governor Schwarzenegger Vetoes AB 2279. Patient Rights Jeopardizedby
Misstep!,
ZIMBIO.COM,
Oct.
1,
2008,
http://www.zimbio.com/Govemor+Amold+Schwarzenegger+/articles/1 22/Govemor+Schwarzenegg
er+vetoes+AB+2279+Patient.
133. But see Barber v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-0173-EFS, 2005 WL 1607189, at *2 (E.D. Wash.
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not affect job performance, a disabled individual using medical
marijuana for treatment may find solace in the last place they would
look: the federal government.
II.

MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

An employee who is terminated due to his medical marijuana use
may be able to state a claim under the ADA. 134 To succeed with a claim
under the ADA, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) he or she is
"disabled" according to the ADA; 2) that he or she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation; and 3) the employer discriminated against the plaintiff
because of the plaintiffs disability. 135 A disability is defined as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual." ' 3 6 If the person has a record

July 1, 2005) (holding that defendants did not violate the ADA when they terminated Barber based
on his marijuana use), and Dvorak v. Clean Water Servs., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095, 1099 (D. Or.
2006) (holding that defendant's termination of Dvorak, who used "medical marijuana," did not
violate the ADA). At first glance, Barber and Dvorak seem to foreclose consideration of the option
of protecting medical marijuana users under the ADA, but upon closer examination, neither case
speaks dispositively on the issue. Barber only concerned Title II of the ADA, governing public
entities, and is not binding on private employers. Barber, 2005 WL 1607189, at * 1;see also infra
text accompanying notes 277-86 (discussing Barber in more detail). Dvorak is not dispositive
either because first, the court found that the plaintiff was not disabled and he was not regarded as
having a disability, Dvorak, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1099; and second, even though the plaintiff used
medical marijuana, the court made no substantive findings on the issue of whether the employer
needed to accommodate the use of medical marijuana in any way. Id. at 1095, 1099. See also
Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 164 (holding that defendant's termination
of Washburn, who used medical marijuana, did not violate the ADA, but also noting that "[b]ecause
we conclude that the question of plaintiffs status as a disabled person is dispositive in this case, we
limit the scope of our inquiry to that issue").
134. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION & UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, EEOC BULL. No. 915.002 (2002), at
39, available at
www.eeoc/gov/policy/docs/accommodation/htm.
The EEOC Guidelines state that medications
along with their side effects should be considered part of the disability, and accommodated for as
well. Id.
135. Accord Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007); McPherson v.
O'Reilly Auto. Inc., 491 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2007); Thompson v. Henderson, 226 Fed. App'x.
466, 471 (6th Cir. 2007); Boone v. Rumsfeld, 172 Fed. App'x. 268, 271 (11 th Cir. 2006); Tobin v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 104 (Ist Cir. 2005); Burke v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
142 Fed. App'x. 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005); MacKenzie v. Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir.
2005); Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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of such an impairment or is regarded as having such an137
impairment, then
he may also be able to claim a disability under the Act.
A. Impairment That SubstantiallyLimits a Major Life Activity
Marijuana may be used to relieve the symptoms of many
impairments 138 that adversely affect major life activities.' 3 9 The
following conditions, for which marijuana may provide relief, 140 have
14 1
been considered to be "impairments" by the courts: HIV infection,
cancer, 142 chronic or acute pain, 143 insomnia, 144 glaucoma, 145 multiple

sclerosis, 146 anorexia, 147 and epilepsy. 148 Some of the affected major live
activities are more obvious than others, depending on the impairment
that the individual is claiming. For example, a plaintiff who has
149
glaucoma will claim that their major life activity of seeing is limited.
One who has severe nausea from cancer treatment, has the wasting effect

137. Id. § 12102(2)(B)-(C).
138. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998). An "impairment" is defined as the following:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id. § 1630.2(h)(l)-(2). The ADA, as amended contains a list of possible "major life activities"
which include, but are not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating and working." ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),
Pub. L. No. 110-335, § 3(2)(A) (2008).
139. See Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation, supra note 7, at 12.
140. See id. at 20-24.
141. See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 625 (1997).
142. See Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D.N.H. 2002).
143. See generallyGreen v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., No. 3:06CV01867, 2007 WL 2815573,
at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2007) (stating that acute back pain can be considered an impairment
under the ADA; however, plaintiff in this particular case did not present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate he suffered a physical impmairment).
144. See Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705, at *5 (1 1th Cir. Aug. 24.2007).
145. See generally Mondaine v. Am. Drug Stores, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1200 (D. Kan.
2006) (stating that glaucoma can be considered an impairment under the ADA; however, plaintiff in
this particular case did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof).
146. See Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
147. See Shalbert v. Marcincin, No. Civ.A.04-5116, 2005 WL 1941317, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9,
2005).
148. See Taylor v. USF-Red Star Exp., Inc., 212 Fed. App'x. 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2006).
149. Mondaine, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
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caused by AIDS, or is otherwise anorexic, may claim that this
impairment caused their major life activity of eating to be limited. 5 , If
the plaintiff has been authorized to use marijuana because of insomnia or
some other sleep impairment, then he may claim that his major life
activity of sleeping is adversely affected. 5 '
Another potential argument is that the medical marijuana use itself
is the disability. 5 2 The plaintiff may attempt to claim that the major life
activities of learning or concentrating have been affected.153 Another
possible theory, suggested in a footnote in Washburn v. Columbia Forest
Products, Inc. 154 is that the employee may claim that the marijuana use
substantially limited the major life activity of "employment."' 155 In order
for the employee to succeed with such a theory, they must be limited
from working a "broad class of jobs."'' 56 Since many jobs require that an
employee abstain from marijuana use, this claim may prove to be
successful.

150. Shalbert, 2005 WL 1941317, at *4.
151. E.g., Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 24,
2007).
152. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 134, at 39.
153. A noted side effect of marijuana is having trouble with their memory or learning.
Marijuanaaddiction.info, Marijuana Side Effects, http://www.marijuana-addiction.info/sideeffects.htm (last visited May 18, 2009).
154. 104 P.3d 609 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
155. Id. at 612 n.3.
156. Id. at 612; see also Dvorak,432 F. Supp. 2d 1090. The employee was fired from a safety
sensitive manual job after a doctor told the employer that the medication the employee was using
for pain, including opiate-based pills and medical marijuana, may affect the employee during
working hours. Id. at 1097. Dvorak attempted to bring a case pursuant to the ADA under the
theory that the employer mistakenly perceived that he had a disability, and claimed that the
employer believed that the major life activity of working was substantially limited. Id. at 1099.
However, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant believed the plaintiff was limited from a broad
class of jobs and not just a single job. Id. at 1107. Even though the supervisor said, "I would not
even put you behind a computer," the court did not find this strong enough to pass summary
judgment on the issue of perceived disability. Id. The plaintiff claimed that by saying this, the
employer thought that Dvorak was not fit for any job, sedentary or active. Id. However, the court
determined this literally meant that the employer would not give the employee a job involving
computer work. Id.
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B. The United States Supreme Court "SubstantiallyLimits" the
Protection of the ADA
Although the original intent of the ADA's drafters was to establish

a broad scope of protection, 157 many employees were denied relief under
the ADA because their impairment did not qualify as a disability under
the definition set forth in the original ADA.

Supreme Court decisions,

Through a string of

the ADA protections

were extremely

narrowed. One study in 2003 found that the employer prevailed in
approximately 97% of the decisions.158
One of these Supreme Court decisions was Sutton v. United Air
Lines.159 The Supreme Court decided that Congress intended mitigating

measures, such as medications and prosthetics, to be taken into account
when determining whether an individual was disabled.

60

The Court

noted that the phrase "substantially limits a major life activity," was in
the present tense, and thus, the issue of whether an individual had a
disability needed to be assessed presently with consideration given to

any ameliorating factors. 16' The requirement to take mitigating factors
into account would have a significant impact on the issue of medical
marijuana. Specifically, since marijuana is used as a medication, an
individual who uses marijuana to treat an impairment may no longer be
disabled, and the person will no longer have protection under the
ADA. 6
Thus, if the employee is no longer disabled due to the

marijuana, even if the adverse employment action was in response to the
marijuana use, the employee will not receive any protection from the
ADA. 163

157. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2008) (enacted).
158. Amy L. Allbright, 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update,
28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 309, 319 (2004).
159. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
160. Id. at 482.
161. Id.
162. Washburn, 104 P.3d at 612. The Court of Appeals discussed the trial court's ruling that
since the marijuana alleviated the plaintiffs muscle spasms, he was no longer disabled and, thus, no
longer received protections under the Oregon disability law. Id.
163. Compare Washburn, 104 P.3d at 609 (rejecting ADA coverage because the marijuana use
alleviated employee's muscle spasms and was thus no longer disabled), with American with
Disabilities Act Now Applies to More People, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 2009 available at
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/triage/2009/01/american-disabi.html#more
(Robert Burgdorf
Jr., a professor of law at David Clarke School of Law at the University of the District of Columbia
makes the point that an individual with well-managed epilepsy would not prevail on a disability
discrimination charge under the ADA against an employer who put up signs stating that "epileptics
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Congress responded to the Supreme Court's tapering of the ADA's
protection with the 2008 amendments, which became effective January
1, 2009.164 Congress expressly overruled Sutton, enacting rules of
construction that now read, "the determination of whether [a person is
disabled] shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures such as medication ....

,6

Now, employees

seeking protection under the ADA will be "deemed disabled based on
condition, and not based on what therapies they
the underlying medical
66
pursued."'1
have
C. The Duty to Reasonably Accommodate
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of an
individual's disability. 67 "[N]ot making reasonable accommodations" is
included within the statute's definition of the term "discriminate.' ' 68
Employers may be concerned that they may have to accommodate an
employee's use of marijuana at the workplace. However, many states'
medical marijuana laws provide that an employer is not required to
accommodate the medical use of marijuana in the workplace.'6 9 Taking

this language on its own merits, it does not appear to require an
employer to accommodate an employee's use of marijuana. However, if
this language is understood as an express exception to the general rule of
law provided in the ADA-that an employer must accommodate a
disabled employee 70 then the employer may have to accommodate such
use as long as it does not occur at the jobsite.' 7'
not welcome here").
164. See Americans with DisabilitiesAct Now Applies to More People, supra note 163; S. 3406
supra note 157.
165. S. 3406 supra note 157, § 3(E)(1).
166. American with DisabilitiesAct Now Applies to More People,supra note 163.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual .... ").
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Employers are only required to make reasonable
accommodations as long as they do not impose undue hardships. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.15(d). The ADA defines an "undue hardship" as an "action requiring significant
difficulty or expense . . ." and many of the factors to be considered deal with the expense of the
accommodation relative to the overall size and financial resources of the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10) (2000).
169. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.340(2)

(West 2003).
170.
171.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Compare Washburn, 104 P.3d at 612 (holding that the provision stating that an employer

need not accommodate the use medical use of marijuana at the workplace only including the
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drug policies that require

employees to abstain from marijuana use. To enforce these policies,
employers may require employees pass a pre-employment drug test
through urinalysis. 172 The employer may also require that an employee
be drug tested throughout the course of employment.173 The ADA does

not limit an employer's ability to perform drug tests in order to
determine whether or not the employee is engaging in the illegal use of

drugs. 174 An employee, who used marijuana even for medical purposes,
may be in violation of their workplace drug policy.

One of the examples of a reasonable accommodation in the ADA is
to change or modify workplace policies.1 75 When a policy is changed to

make a reasonable accommodation, it is only altered for the disabled
individual and not for the employees as a whole. 176 Thus, waiving or
altering the employer's drug policy concerning the medical use of

marijuana may be a reasonable accommodation.
Most employers drug test through urinalysis.

77

Urinalysis cannot

determine current impairment, but in some cases can determine if they
have used marijuana in the previous two to six weeks.

78

Medical

marijuana advocates suggest a model workplace policy whereby the
employer would test the blood or saliva, instead of the urine, of an
employee.1 79 This test would have the ability to determine if the
employee used marijuana within the past few hours, opposed to the past

possession, administration or distribution of the drug at the workplace, and did not include using the
drug at home during off-duty hours and having trace elements of the drug in the employee's urine at
work. The Court left open for the trial court what a "reasonable accommodation" would be under
Oregon law.), with Ross, 174 P.3d at 206-08 (holding that the provision stating that nothing in the
California Compassionate Use Act required the accommodation of marijuana in the workplace was
not an exception to a general rule of accommodation in the FEHA).
172. See Peter B. Bensinger, Drug Testing in the Workplace, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 43, 44 (1998).
173. Id. at 45.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (2000).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
176. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation & Undue Hardship under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), 24 (Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter
ComplianceManual].
177. DALE H. GIERINGER, URINALYSIS OR UROMANCY: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF DRUG
TESTING ABUSE, availableat http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4936.
178. Id.
179. THE NAT'L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA
WORKPLACE
POLICY
FOR

LAWS, NORML's MODEL
CANNABIS

http://norml.org/index.cfm/content/facts/pdf_files/breif blank/index.cfm?Group-lD=7161.
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few weeks. 180 This impairment test may be a reasonable accommodation
for an employee who uses medical marijuana.
D. Terminationfor Misconduct or DiscriminationAgainst Disability
Some courts have recognized the distinction "between termination
of employment because of misconduct and termination of employment
because of a disability."'1 8 1 An employer who terminates or disciplines
an employee for using medical marijuana may attempt to defend such
action by claiming it was not based on the employee's disability, but
instead on the employee's workplace misconduct.
Of course, employers are permitted to terminate employees due to
their misconduct, regardless of whether or not the employee has a
disability.' 82 On the other hand, "conduct resulting from a disability is
considered part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for
termination."' 83 Because of this, medical marijuana is in an interesting
situation. While the use of the drug will violate a workplace conduct
rule, its use may be conduct resulting from the disability, and, therefore,
should be accommodated.
This dichotomy has previously surfaced in the context of drug use.
In Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 184 eight employees, who did not
claim that they used marijuana for medical purposes, were terminated
for recreational on-the-job use of marijuana. 185 The employees claimed
that the termination was in violation of the ADA because they were
addicted to the drug, and thus disabled. 186 The court rejected their claim,

180. Id. Urinalysis, the standard form of drug testing in the workplace is not suitable for
detecting cannabis impairment or recent cannabis use. The procedure can only detect the presence
of metabolites, not the psychoactive parent compound THC. Id. The metabolites can be detected
several days to several weeks after the use of marijuana, and cannot test whether the employee is
currently impaired or affected by the drug on the job. Id. Companies may have vital interests in
ensuring a safe workplace environment, and may still enforce a drug policy. Id. However,
NORML recommends that an employer test the employee's blood or saliva which can determine
recent cannabis use by detecting the presence of THC, not the metabolites. Id. Both blood and
saliva can detect the presence of THC a few hours past the use, and sometimes one to two days after
the use. Id.
181. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995).
182.

Id.

183. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n., 239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001); Dark v.
Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006).
184. 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995).
185. Id. at 831.
186. Id. at 832.
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and held that the employer could terminate them because they were
engaging in "the illegal use of drugs," and the ADA does not limit an
187
employer's ability to discipline employees for engaging in such use.
In fact, according to the ADA, if a person engages in "illegal use of
drugs," and the employer acts on the basis of such use, then the person is
not a "qualified individual with a disability."' 8 8 Therefore, it becomes
imperative to determine whether an employee who utilizes medical
marijuana as a result of the employee's disability is engaging in the
"illegal use of drugs."' 189 If the medical use of marijuana is not an
"illegal use of drugs" and it is conduct that results from a disability, then
the employer may be liable if he discriminates on the basis of its use.
III. IS THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA AN "ILLEGAL USE OF DRUGS"
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT?

The ADA permits employers to terminate employees who use
illegal drugs, even when that employee is disabled, as long as the drug
use is the basis of the employment decision. 90 If the medical use of
marijuana is considered an "illegal use of a drug," then the employer
will not be liable for terminating a disabled employee, as long as the
decision was based on the medical marijuana use.
At first glance, this appears to ban an employee who is terminated
or otherwise discriminated against for using marijuana from bringing a
claim under the ADA. After all, the Supreme Court held in Gonzales v.
Raich' 91 that medical marijuana is considered an illegal drug under
9
federal law even in states that allow its medical consumption.' 2
However, the ADA's definition of the phrase "illegal use of drugs"
supports an argument that the phrase does not include the medical use of

187. ld. at 833.
188. 42U.S.C.§ 12114(a).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) "[T]he term 'qualified individual with a disability' shall not include
an employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered
entity acts on the basis of such use. Id. An employee must be a "qualified individual with a
disability" in order to bring a claim under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). When employer
fires an employee for using illegal drugs that employee will no longer be a "qualified individual."
See id.
191. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
192. See generally Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1. The Supreme Court held Congress has the authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate manufacture and possession of marijuana, even if
for medical purposes.
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marijuana. 193

The ADA's definition of "illegal use of drugs" provides:

The term "illegal use of drugs" means the use of drugs, the possession
or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances
Act .... Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under
supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses
authorized by94 the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of
Federal law.'

The definition of "illegal use of drugs" can be separated into three
elements. Each element will be labeled with a letter, as the following:
The term 'illegal use of drugs' means:
A
Use of drugs,
possession or
distribution of which
is unlawful under the
CSA

B
Use of a drug taken
under supervision by a
professional

C
Other uses [of drugs]
authorized by the
CSA or other
provisions
of Federal
Law 195

If the designated letters are substituted for the elements then the
definition will appear as:
The term196"illegal use of drugs" means A. Such term does not include
B, or C.
To determine whether medical marijuana is illegal for purposes of
the ADA, each element will be separately analyzed.

193. See Ed Reeves, Clarence Belnavis & Stoel Rives, The Impact of Medical MarijuanaLaws
on Employment in the Wild, Wild West, A.B.A. at 6 (2000) ("However, the ADA also states that the
illegal use of drugs 'does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health
care professional . . . .' Thus, depending on how courts interpret this exception, medical marijuana
use under a doctor's supervision might be permitted under the ADA."); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
195. Id. The definition of "illegal use of drugs" in the ADA exudes three distinct uses of a
drug. The first sentence, labeled Element A, is the use of a drug, the possession or distribution of
which is unlawful under the CSA. Id. The first clause of the second sentence, labeled Element B, is
the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional. Id. Finally, the
second clause of the second sentence, following the comma, labeled Element C, is the use of a drug
authorized by the CSA or other provisions of federal law. See id.
196. Id.
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A. Use of Drugs, Possession or Distributionof Which Is Unlawful Under
the CSA

Medical marijuana is a drug, the possession or distribution of which
is unlawful under the CSA. Since marijuana is a Schedule I drug,'

97

the

distribution of it is unlawful under the CSA without regard to its
purpose. 98 Additionally, the Supreme Court has interpreted the CSA as
outlawing the possession of marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich' 99 and
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 200 even when

possessed and distributed solely for medical purposes. Therefore,
medical marijuana is a drug of which possession or distribution is
unlawful under the CSA, and medical marijuana therefore meets the
definition of Element A.

Under Element A alone, the medical use of

marijuana appears to be an "illegal use of drugs."2 0 '
B. Use of a Drug Taken Under Supervision of a Licensed Healthcare
Professional
Next, Element B is determined by whether medical marijuana is a

"drug taken under supervision by a licensed healthcare professional.
The term "under supervision" is somewhat ambiguous.

20 2

It is unclear

whether the phrase refers to a drug taken under direct supervision of a
licensed healthcare professional, meaning actually

in the doctor's

presence, or to a drug authorized or prescribed by a doctor during the
course of treatment.20

3

197. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000). Drugs in this category have a "high potential for abuse," "no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and a "lack of accepted safety for
use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision." Id.
198. 21 U.S.C § 828(a) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000). It is unlawful unless pursuant to an
order issued by the Attorney General. Therefore, if there are people who distribute marijuana
pursuant to such an order, such distribution would not be unlawful; see generally Nat'l Inst. on
Drug Abuse, Nat'l Advisory Council on Drug Abuse, Jan. 1998 available at
http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/nacda/marijuanastatement.html.
A group of seven
individuals receive medical marijuana pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney General as part
of a federal compassionate use program. Id.
199. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). There will be a discussion in the Element C section, infra, of
arguments that may have been left open by the Supreme Court decision.
200. 532 U.S. 483, 494 and n. 7 (2001). The CSA prohibits the manufacture and distribution
of marijuana, even when it is for medical purposes. Id.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6) (2000).
202. Id.
203. See generally McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr. 869 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1994);
Toscano v. Nat'l Broad. Co., No. 99 Civ. 10006, 2000 WL 1742097 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000);
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All three federal district courts that have considered the definition
of "illegal use of drugs" have implied that the meaning of "under
supervision" was the latter. In McDaniel v. Mississippi Baptist Medical
Ctr.,2 °4 the court's ruling implied that it understood "under supervision
by a licensed health care professional," to mean the drug's use was
authorized by a licensed health care professional. 20 5 Toscano v. National
Broadcasting Company20 6 implied a stricter reading; an individual
abusing a prescribed drug outside the presence of a licensed health care
20 7
professional was no longer taking the drug "under supervision.
These courts seem to agree that the drug does not have to be
administered in the physical presence of the physician to be considered
"under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional" as long as it
was taken during the course of treatment. °8 Additionally, the court in
Barber v. Gonzales20 9 assumed that medical marijuana was a drug taken
"under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional., 210 None of
these courts indicated that the drug must have been taken in the physical
presence of their doctor.
Physicians who advise their patients on the use of medical
marijuana have the same moral, ethical, and legal responsibilities to use
their best judgment in "accordance with their training, experience and
clinical insight" as they do when recommending other controlled

Barber v. Gonzales, No. C-05-01-0173, 2005 WL 1607189 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
204. 869 F. Supp. 445 (1994).
205. See id. at 449. This can be inferred because the court, in figuring out how to structure 42
U.S.C. § 12611 1(6)(A), held that the second sentence of the definition of "illegal use of drugs" did
not abrogate the first sentence. The employee obtained drugs through deceit and deception by
exaggerating his ailments to his physicians. Since this act is outlawed by the CSA, the court held

that the drugs were illegal. In order for the court to reason this, the court must have determined that
the individual was taking drugs "under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional," or else it
would not have had to hold that the second sentence did not abrogate the first sentence. Therefore,
the Court ruled that the drug was taken "under supervision" when it was prescribed, even though
that prescription was based on deceit, and the drugs were being abused. Id.
206. No. 99 Civ. 10006, 2000 WL 1742097 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000).
207. See id. at *3. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination if the
prescription medication were being abused. If the drugs were abused, then they were no longer
taken "under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional," and it would be an "illegal use of
drugs." Id.
208. See id.; see also McDaniel, 869 F. Supp. at 449.
209. Barber v. Gonzales, No. C-05-0173, 2005 WL 1607189 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
210. Id. at 2. The court concluded that medical marijuana was an "illegal use of drugs." Id.
The court implied that medical marijuana was taken "under supervision of a licensed healthcare
professional," however the court construed the definition to mean the drug use must also be
pursuant to federal law. Id. at I.
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substances or another form of therapy. 2 1' According to a brief submitted
in Ross v. RagingWire on behalf of associations of physicians, nurses
and other public health practitioners, 2 12 "should a physician choose [to
recommend the medical use of marijuana], a formal recommendation
should be made in the context of a proper doctor-patient relationship and
21 3
in compliance with the professional standards of the community."
Thus, when a doctor recommends the use of medical marijuana, the use
is considered to be "under supervision" as it is substantially similar to
any other treatment a doctor may recommend or prescribe.
1. Ambiguity?
Before considering Element C, the definition of "illegal use of
drugs" already appears to be contradictory when it comes to medical
marijuana. Inasmuch as medical marijuana is both illegal to possess and
distribute under the CSA and also a drug that is taken under supervision
of a licensed healthcare professional, medical marijuana meets both
Element A and Element B. As stated above, the definition reads:
The term "illegal use of drugs" means A. Such term does not include

B, or C.
Therefore, the medical use of marijuana is an "illegal use of drugs"
by the terms of Element A. Simultaneously, by the terms of Element B,
the term "illegal use of drugs" does not include medical marijuana.
Perhaps Element C will clarify this ambiguity.
C. Uses [ofDrugs] Authorized By the CSA or Other Provisionsof
FederalLaw
There is a handful of individuals who use medical marijuana that is
Though the current
expressly authorized by federal la214
understanding is that medical marijuana is illegal under federal law
except for these selected few, the authors of this Note have recognized
two arguments that the CSA or other provisions of federal law can be

211. Amici Curiae Brief of American Pain Foundation, Ross v. RagingWire, No. C043392,
(Cal. 2006), supra note 7, at 9-10.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id. at 10.
214. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 198.
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interpreted as authorizing the use of medical marijuana.
These
arguments may still be viable even after the Supreme Court's holding in
Gonzales v. Raich.2 15
1. The Selected Few in the Compassionate Use Program
The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") is the sole source
of legal medical marijuana in the United States.21 6 In 1978, as part of a
legal settlement, NIDA began to supply marijuana to patients whose
physicians applied for and received permission from the Food and Drug
217
Administration.
In 1992, the program ended and the Federal
government stopped supplying medical marijuana to new patients.21 8
However, NIDA continues to supply marijuana to those patients who
were receiving the drug at the time of the termination.2 ' 9 Today, there
are only seven individuals that receive marijuana legally as authorized
by the federal government.220
2. The Controlled Substances Act
Generally, the CSA is understood to outlaw the use of marijuana,
even for medical purposes.
However, there is an argument, not
presented in Gonzales v. Raich,2 2 1 that the text of the CSA authorizes
state-sanctioned medical marijuana.222
Section 844(a) of the CSA
outlines the penalties for simple possession.223 It reads, "it shall be
unlawful for any person . ..to possess a controlled substance unless
such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription
or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his
professional practice. 224 If this text were read on its own, as long as
marijuana is obtained "pursuant to a valid prescription," then the

215. See generally 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the federal government through the
commerce clause has the power to regulate controlled substances such as marijuana, however, the
court did not look to the forthcoming arguments).
216. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 198.

217. Id.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.

220. Id.
221.

545 U.S. 1 (2005).

222.

See id. at 63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

223.

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000) (emphasis added).

224. Id.
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possession would not be unlawful.2 25
Section 829 of the CSA sets out the legal methods through which
controlled substances may be prescribed. 6 The provision sets out the
methods for substances in Schedules II through V, but is silent for
Schedule I substances, such as marijuana.2 27 This silence is generally
understood as a ban on the prescription of Schedule I substances, but a
possible reading of the silence is a reservation of the states' right to
enact legislation that allows the prescription of these substances.
Section 903 provides that the CSA does not preempt state laws that
are "within the authority of the State" unless there is a "positive conflict
between [the CSA] and that state law so that the two cannot consistently
stand together., 228 Courts have consistently recognized that the practice
of medicine is in the province of the states.2 29 In 2006, the Supreme
Court ruled, in a different context, that the CSA did not change this
proposition.230 Since the CSA is silent on the methods by which
Schedule I drugs may be prescribed,23' then there is no "positive
conflict" as required by section 903 when states authorize their medical
professionals to "prescribe" medical marijuana.232
The question then becomes whether a medical professional's
recommendation to use marijuana is, in fact, a "prescription." The CSA
does not contain a definition for the term "prescription. ' '233 A federal
district court came up with the definition of the term in a different
context by turning to a dictionary and found that "prescription" was, "a

225. This argument was never raised in the Supreme Court. It was raised on remand to the
Ninth Circuit, however, the court did not rule due to the tenet not to "consider arguments that are
raised for the first time on appeal." Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 868 (9th Cir. 2007). But see
K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the FederalPreemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana
Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 221, 289 (2005) (citing United States v. Nazir, 211 F. Supp.
2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2002)). Duvivier argued that a district court's definition of the term
"prescription," as applied to medical marijuana may render the drug lawful under section 844(a) of
the CSA. Id.
226. 21 U.S.C. § 829.
227. Id.
228. 21 U.S.C. § 903.
229. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) ("[D]irect control of medical practice in the
states is beyond the power of the federal government."); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597, 603 n.
30 (1997); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002).
230. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). The Supreme Court held that despite the
Attorney General's declaration that physician-assisted suicide is unlawful under the CSA, section
903 allowed states to adopt laws authorizing the practice. Id.
231. 21 U.S.C. § 829.
232. 21 U.S.C. § 903.
233. See generally21 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
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bona fide order-i.e., directions for the preparation and administration of
a medicine, remedy, or drug for a real patient who actually needs it after
some sort of examination or consultation by a licensed doctor. ' 234 As
noted by one commentator, if this definition were applied to the CSA in
the medical marijuana context, then the recommendation of a doctor to
use medical marijuana may be a "prescription." 235 Therefore, since
states would be authorized through section 903 to enact laws allowing
the "prescription" of Schedule I substances, and the possession of
medical marijuana is pursuant to a valid "prescription,, 236 the possession
of medical marijuana is lawful.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment-Substantive Due Process
Element C, states the term "illegal use of drugs" does not include
use of a drug that is authorized by the CSA or other provisions of federal
law.237 Some claim the substantive due process doctrine supports the
federal authorization of medical marijuana.2 38 If it were deemed that the
right to medical marijuana is a fundamental right, then laws restricting
its use would have to be analyzed utilizing strict scrutiny. 239 A Harvard
Law Review note contemplated the substantive due process rights of
patients who use medical marijuana as a last resort. 240 The note
reviewed fundamental rights such as the right to live, to die with dignity,
to avoid severe physical suffering, and to exercise medical autonomy
within the context of a patient who uses medical marijuana. 241 A
separate law review article focused on medical marijuana and the right
of palliative care.242 The Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg24 3

234.

United States v. Nazir, 211 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D.N.J. 2002).

235. DuVivier, supra note 225 at 288-89.
236. But see id. at 289 n. 379. Duvivier noted that since marijuana is a schedule I substance,
one may argue that there could be no "valid prescription" because schedule I substances are not safe
even under medical supervision. Id. However, a court may determine that "valid" only refers to
validity under state law. Id.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
238. See Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process
Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1985 (2005); Adam Hyatt,
Medicinal Marijuana and Palliative Care: Carving a Liberty Interest Out of the Glucksberg
Framework, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. 1345 (2006).
239. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 301-02 (1993).
240. Note, supra note 238 at 1990-91.
241. Id. at 1990.
242. Hyatt, supra note 238 at 1348.
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held that a terminally ill patient did not have the fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide.244 However, the concurring opinions of five
justices left open the possibility of challenging a law that restricts a
patient from obtaining palliative care. 245 Thus, it is conceivable that a
person with a severe disease, whose only ability to obtain palliative care
is to use medical marijuana, may have a substantive due process claim.
The Ninth Circuit in Raich v. Gonzales246 determined that an
individual who uses medical marijuana does not have a substantive due
process claim.247 The court phrased the purported fundamental interest
as a "right to make life-shaping decision on a physician's advice to use
medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid intolerable pain,
and preserve life, when all other prescribed medications and remedies
have failed., 24 8 The court attempted to determine whether this right is
"deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. ' 249 The court noted that the nation has a long
history of marijuana use, both medical and otherwise. 250 Even though all
fifty states criminalized possession of marijuana by 1965, almost all
states created exceptions for using the drug when a medical professional
authorized its use.251 In fact, it was not until the passage of the CSA in
1970 that all marijuana use, medical and otherwise, became illegal.2 52 In
agreeing with Raich, the court held that marijuana's use as a treatment
had gained traction in recent years. 3 However, the court further held
that use of medical marijuana, even as a last resort, is not a fundamental
right.254 The court stated, "[a]lthough that day has not yet dawned,
considering that during the last ten years eleven states [now thirteen]
of medical marijuana, that day may be upon us
have legalized the use 255
expected.
sooner than

243.

521 U.S. 702 (1997).

244. Id. at 728.
245. Id. at 736-92; Hyatt, supra note 238, at 1354.
246. 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir 2007). This case was decided on remand from the Supreme Court's
decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Id.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

866.
864.

252.

Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).

253.

Raich, 500 F.3d at 866.

254.

Id.

255.

Id.

864-65.
865 (citing Leary v. United States 395 U.S. 6, 16-17 (1969)).
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Besides the select group of individuals federally authorized to use
marijuana, medical marijuana does not currently appear to be a drug
authorized by the CSA or federal law. If either of the above arguments
is successful in court then medical marijuana may become a drug
authorized by federal law; however, for the present medical marijuana
does not meet Element C.
D. Back to the Text
The definition of "illegal use of drugs" in the ADA is clearly
ambiguous in its application to the medical use of marijuana.256 Yet,
Element A states that if the drug's distribution or possession is unlawful
under the CSA, then the use of the drug is illegal.25 7 When solely
focusing on Element A, the use of medical marijuana appears to be
illegal. Yet Element B and Element C make exceptions to Element A.
Medical marijuana is a drug taken "under supervision of a licensed
healthcare professional.,

258

However,

currently it is not a drug

authorized by the CSA or other provisions of federal law. Therefore,
medical marijuana meets Element B, but it does not meet Element C.
Again, substituting the elements for the phrases and the definition is
read:
The term "illegal use of drugs" means A. Such term does not include
B, or C

It will be left to the courts to determine how this definition should
be applied to medical marijuana. However, it appears that the second
sentence creates two separate exceptions to the first sentence. The
phrase "[s]uch term does not include" creates at least one exception to
the first sentence, and the "comma," followed by an "or," separating
Element B and Element C, creates two distinct exceptions from Element
A. Meaning, as a general rule, if a drug's distribution or possession is
unlawful under the CSA, then the drug is illegal. However, if the drug is
used either under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional, or
authorized by CSA or other provisions of federal law, then the drug is
not illegal.
Therefore, since medical marijuana is taken "under
supervision of a licensed healthcare professional" it is not an "illegal use
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(6)(A) (2000).
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
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of drugs." However, since the plain language is not entirely clear, it is
important turn to the legislative history for guidance.259
E. Legislative History
Two descriptions of the term "illegal use of drugs" that appear in
House Reports offer some direction on how to interpret the statute. One
such description of the definitions of "illegal use of drugs" was:
[T]he use of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful
under the Controlled Substances Act and does not mean the use of
controlled substances taken under supervision by a licensed health care
professional or other uses authorized
by the Controlled Substances Act
260
or other provisions of Federal law.
In this description, the phrase "such term does not include.. ." was
substituted for the phrase "and does not mean .... ,,26' The phrases,
"such term does not include" and "and does not mean," both seem to
create at least one exception to Element A.262 They state, unequivocally
what "illegal use of drugs" are not, and they are not "drugs taken under
supervision by a licensed healthcare professional, 263
or otherwise
law.,
federal
of
provisions
other
or
CSA
the
by
authorized
In House Report No. 101-485, another description of the definition
clarifies that not only is the second sentence an exception to Element A,
but Element B and Element C are two separate exceptions. 264 "The term
'Illegal use of drugs' does not include the use of controlled substances,
including the use of experimental drugs, taken under supervision of a
licensed health care professional. It also does not include uses
authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of
federal law. 2 65 By using the phrase "it also does not include . . ." to
separate Element B from Element C, the description of the "illegal use
of drugs" used in this report clarifies that Element B and Element C are,

259. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 315-16 (1953); U.S. v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 53-55 (2d Cir. 2003) (If a statute's language is ambiguous, the court may
turn to legislative history in order to determine the legislative intent.).
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

H.R. REP. No. 101-558, at 56 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
See H.R. REP. No. 101-558; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
H.R. REp. No. 101-55, at 56; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 32 (1990).

265.

Id. (emphasis added).
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two
~ explanation
~~266antoaloicuethus
in fact, two separate
exceptions.~~~ The
also includes the use
267
This demonstrates the intent of
of experimental drugs in Element B.
Congress that the use of a drug, experimental or otherwise, taken under
supervision of a licensed health care professional will not be an "illegal
use of drugs. 26 8 Thus, using the two descriptions of the definition of
"illegal use of drugs," it appears that the second sentence creates two
separate exceptions to Element A.
The same house report indicates that when a drug is taken "under
supervision of a licensed healthcare professional" it is not an "illegal use
of drugs." The report discusses the right of employees to not disclose
their medical conditions to prospective employers, and states "[T]he
committee wishes to emphasize . . . the right of individuals who are
legally taking drugs (e.g., taking drugs under medical supervision for
their disability) not to disclose their medical condition .... ,,169 Thus,

according to the report, drugs taken under medical supervision during
the course of treatment are taken legally.
The House Report not only clarifies that Element B, standing on its
own, is an exception from Element A, but it also states the intended
purpose of Element B. The report states:
The term "illegal drugs" . . . does not include drugs taken under

supervision by a licensed health care professional. The exempted
category includes, for example, experimental drugs taken under
supervision. Many people with disabilities, such as people with
epilepsy, AIDS, and mental illness, take a variety of drugs, including
experimental drugs, under supervision by a health care professional.
on the basis of use of such drugs would not be
Discrimination
270
allowed.

It is clear from this report that Element B was intended to prohibit
discrimination based on an employees' medication use, even if the
medication was experimental, as long as the drug was taken under the
supervision of a health care professional. This report clearly states that
Element B is an exempted category,271 showing that if a drug is taken
under supervision of a licensed health care professional it is not an
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 79 (emphasis added).
Id.
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272
"illegal use of a drug."
The question of an employee's use of medical marijuana was
actually discussed during the legislative history of the ADA. In the
Senate hearing, the Deputy Attorney General John P. Mackey noted that
the administration

[does] not wish to penalize those persons who, in limited cases, are
using "controlled substances" such as marijuana or morphine under
the supervision of medical professionals as part of a course of
treatment ....
These persons would
fall under the same category as
273
those who are users of legal drugs.

Even though this statement was made seven years before states
began enacting medical marijuana laws,274 there appears to be a clear
intent not to include the medical use of marijuana in the ADA's
definition of "illegal use of drugs. 275 The statute was written in such a
manner, and the legislative history clarifies that drugs, including
marijuana, used under the supervision of a licensed healthcare
professional are not illegal uses of a drug for purposes of the ADA. 27 6 It
is apparent that Congress intended the definition to be understood such
that Element B and Element C are two separate and independent
exceptions to Element A.
Could this actually be what Congress intended? Would the ADA
be expanding the scope of the CSA if this were how the definition is
read? One of the purposes of the CSA was to control the traffic of drugs
in the United States.277 While one of the purposes of the ADA was to
end disability discrimination, and, if need be, require employers to

272.

See id.

273. Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 828, 837-38 (1989)
(emphasis added). But see Michael Vitielo, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the
Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 707, 735 (1998) (arguing that the
language of the second sentence, containing Element B and Element C, required that a drug taken

"under supervision of a licensed healthcare professional" had to be a drug whose was otherwise

legal under the CSA. Vitiello believed that Deputy Attorney General Mackey's statement only
referred to those select few in the federal Compassionate Use Program.). Vitielo, supra note 273, at

735.
274. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). The hearing took place in
1989, while California did not pass the CUA until 1996.
275.

H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 32 (1990).

276. See id.
277.

See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
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provide reasonable accommodations in the workplace. 278 Specifically
the House Committee stated that they, "[do] not intend to affect the
Controlled Substances Act., 279 Would the CSA be affected if the ADA
required employers to accommodate an employee who used marijuana
solely for medical purposes? If the medical use of marijuana were not
an "illegal use of a drug" for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the drug's status would only enable an employee to be "a qualified
individual with a disability" and thus receive protection under the ADA.
The fact that it is not "illegal" for purposes of the ADA would not
remove it from its Schedule I classification in the CSA, nor would it
prevent the federal government from enforcing the CSA against
marijuana users and distributors.
F. The Interpretationof the Courts
Only three United States District Courts have tackled the ADA's
definition of "illegal use of drugs." All three of these courts interpreted
the provision differently, and two of them held that it had to be
consistent with the CSA in at least some capacity. In McDaniel v.
Mississippi Baptist Medical Ctr.,280 the plaintiff was using various
opiate-derivative painkilling medications and was terminated by his
employer when the abuse was discovered. 28' There was evidence that
the plaintiff exaggerated his physical impairments to his physicians in
order to obtain prescription medication.282 The court attempted to
determine whether or not the drug use was illegal under the ADA.283
The court stated, "[t]hus, a question arises as to whether, in the context
of the present case, the second sentence of [the definition of 'illegal use
of drugs'] takes precedence over the first sentence . . . acting in

conjunction with [section] 843(a) [of the CSA]. 284 Stated differently,
the court is asking whether Element B and Element C create exceptions
to Element A, or whether it must be read in conjunction with Element A,
and in particular, a single provision of the CSA. The specific provision
of the CSA that the court is referring to states, "[i]t shall be unlawful for

278.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 32 (1990).
869 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
Id.
at448.
Id.
at 449.
Id. at 449-50.
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2006).
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any person knowingly or intentionally to acquire or obtain possession of
a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or
subterfuge. 2 85 The CSA rendered illegal the plaintiffs actions of
obtaining drugs by exaggerating his condition to his physician. 286 The
opinion continues:
The Court rules that when Congress enacted [the definition of "illegal
use of drugs"] it in no way intended to abrogate the effect of [section]
843(a)(3). Thus, even though a person may be taking drugs pursuant
to a physician's or other health care professional's supervision, if
misrepresentation or deceit is involved
in obtaining such drugs, that
2 87
person has violated [section] 843(a)(3).
The court assumes that the term "under supervision of a licensed
health care professional" meant "prescribed or authorized by a licensed
health professional," without an inquiry of whether the plaintiff abused
the drugs.2 8 However, according to Toscano v. National Broadcasting
Co. 289 if the drug was being abused, even though it was prescribed, it
was no longer being taken "under supervision" of the physician. 290 Ifthe
McDaniel court had considered the Toscano ruling, it would not have
been necessary to decide whether the second sentence abrogates the first
sentence, since the drug use would not have met either of the exceptions
in the definition, as it was not taken "under supervision of a licensed
healthcare professional."
Therefore, neither Element B (the "under
supervision" exception) nor Element C (the "other uses authorized by
federal law" exception) would apply, and the drug would be illegal
because Element A (the use of a drug, the possession or distribution of
which is unlawful under the CSA), standing on its own, would result in
the drug use being an "illegal use of drugs."
The decision in McDaniel is unclear as to whether or not the court's
construction would apply in other contexts. When the court phrases the
question, it asks whether the second sentence takes prec'edence over the
first "in the context of the present case."2 9 ' Further, the court ruled that
Congress did not intend to abrogate the effect of a particular section of

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3).
See id.
McDaniel, 869 F. Supp. at 449.
See id.
No. 99 Civ. 1006, 2000 WL 1742097 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000).
See id. at *3.
McDaniel, 869 F. Supp. at 449.
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the CSA, specifically section 843(a)(3).292 There is no mention of other
provisions of the CSA which the second sentence of the definition may
or may not abrogate. Therefore, under McDaniel, in the context of a
plaintiff who is prescribed drugs through subterfuge or fraud, Element B
and Element C do not create exceptions to Element A, but must be read
in conjunction with Element A. Under this narrow reading of McDaniel,
only a medical marijuana user who obtains authorization through deceit
will be barred from bringing a claim. 93 However, if this construction is
extended to other contexts, and the second sentence never abrogates
provisions of the CSA, then the medical use of marijuana, in general,
may be illegal under the ADA.2 94
The construction of the definition of "illegal use of drugs" in
Barber v. Gonzales295 is more damaging to a medical marijuana user
who attempts to raise a claim under the ADA. This case, decided on the
heels of Gonzales v. Raich,2 96 was an attempt by the plaintiff to prove
that, while medical marijuana use may be unlawful under provisions of
the CSA, it was not an "illegal use of drugs" under the ADA.297 The
Plaintiff, appearing pro se,298 claimed that Congress intended "to limit
the application of the CSA to non-disabled individuals who engage in
unlawful drug activity," and the definition of "illegal use of drugs" in the
ADA did not include the use of medical marijuana. 299 The plaintiff
brought an action under Title II of the ADA, 300 asserting that
Washington State University discriminated against him by prohibiting
his use of medical marijuana in his dorm room. 30 1 The court believed
that at first glance of the definition of "illegal use of drugs," the
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6). See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 22, 29 (2005). Since marijuana is a Schedule I drug, it's use is illegal under federal law,
regardless if it is for medical purposes. Id. at 22, 29.
295. Barber v. Gonzales, CV-05-0173, 2005 WL 1607189 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
296. Gonzales v. Raich was decided in June 2005. Less then a month later in July 2005,
Barber v. Gonzales was decided. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 1; Barber,2005 WL 1607189.
297. Barber,2005 WL 1607189, at *1.
298. The Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Distinction from Gonzales v. Raich was
handwritten, and the Plaintiff placed his own signature to close the motion. From these facts it can
be assumed that the Plaintiff was acting without an attorney. See Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Distinction From Gonzales v. Raich, Barber v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-0173, 2005 WL
1607189 (E.D. Wash. June 7, 2005) (on file with author).
299. Id.
300.

Id.

301. Letter from Eleanor Finger, Dir. of Residence Life, Washington State Univ., to James E.
Barber (Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with author).
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plaintiffs assertion might be correct. However, absent any cited
authority or even an explanation, the court arrived at a different
conclusion302:
The structure of the second sentence of [the definition of "illegal use of
drugs"] requires the use of the drug taken under the supervision of a
licensed health care professional be consistent with the Controlled
Substances Act. The sentence reads "[the term illegal use of drugs]
does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed
health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law." Accordingly, the
physician-supervised drug must be an authorized drug use under
the
3 03
Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law.
The court interpreted the second sentence, which contains Element
B and Element C, to be an exception to Element A. However, the court
interpreted the second sentence to contain only one exception, and in
order for the drug use not to be illegal it must be used under the
supervision of a licensed health care professional and authorized by the
CSA or other federal law.3 °4 However, the language of the statute states
that the term does not include the use of drugs taken "under the
supervision of a health care professional, or other uses authorized by the
[CSA]., 30 5 The opinion clearly mistakes an "and" for the "or" which
Congress used.
To reiterate, the McDaniel interpretation says that Element B and
Element C must still be consistent with Element A, and therefore the
drug's possession or distribution cannot be unlawful under the CSA.306
If this was accurate, why would Congress use the phrase, "Such term
[the illegal use of drugs] does not include?" Congress seems to have
made at least one exception to the first sentence of the definition.
However, the McDaniel interpretation may be limited to the context of a
person receiving prescription medication through deceit. The Barber
interpretation creates one exception to Element A; if the drug's
302. See Barber,No. C-05-0173, 2005 WL 1607189 at *1.
303. Id. (emphasis included).
304. Id.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
306. See McDaniel, 869 F. Supp. at 449 ("a question arises as to whether, in context of the
present case, the second sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6) takes precedence over the first sentence
of § 12111(6) acting in conjunction with 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3), The Court ruled that when
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6) it in no way intended to abrogate the effect of 21 U.S.C. §
843(a)(3).").
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possession or distribution is unlawful under the CSA then to be legal
under the ADA the drug must be used under the supervision of a
licensed health care professional and authorized by the CSA or other
Federal law.3 °7 However, not only does the actual text of the statute
suggest that there are two exceptions to the first proposition, but the
legislative history makes clear that when a worker's marijuana use is
part of a course of treatment, then it will be considered legal drug use.30 8
CONCLUSION

Currently, the use of medical marijuana is legal pursuant to the law
of thirteen states. However, the federal government still deems all use of
marijuana illegal. This puts those individuals, like Jonathon, who use
marijuana for medical purposes, in an interesting predicament. While
their home state allows them to use the drug, they will be committing a
crime against the federal government.
A person who uses medical marijuana will have another
conundrum, and that is in the field of employment. It may tend to be
very difficult for Jonathon and others who use medical marijuana to
obtain and secure employment, especially with an employer who tests its
employees for their use of drugs.
This Note has discussed an argument that could lead a court to
conclude that marijuana, when used under supervision of a licensed
health care professional, is not an "illegal use of a drug" for purposes of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Since it is, arguably, not illegal
uses of drugs, nothing in the ADA preempts the employee from
receiving protection under the Act. Following the ADA Amendments of
2008, a medical marijuana user may have a higher likelihood of success
compared to a claim brought prior to the amendments. The amendments
state that mitigating measures need not be taken into consideration when
assessing whether an individual has a disability. Therefore, a person's
underlying illness will be the determinative factor whether the individual
has a disability, and not the medication that individual takes. Thus, if
Jonathon's employer discriminates or terminates him, he may be able to

307.

See Barber, No. C-05-0173, 2005 WL 1607189 at*] ("[A]ccordingly, the physician-

supervised drug use must be an authorized drug use under the Controlled Substances Act or other
provisions of Federal Law.").
308. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 828, 837-38
(1989).
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succeed with a claim under the Americans Disabilities Act.
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